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The Appellate Body Approach to the
Applicability of Article XX GATT In the
Light of China – Raw Materials: A Missed
Opportunity?
Ilaria ESPA*
This article attempts to analyse and investigate the implications of the approach to the
applicability of Article XX GATT adopted in the recent China – Raw Materials. Using the
decision on the non-availability of Article XX defences for violations of China’s WTO-plus
commitments on export duties as a backdrop, it scrutinizes the more general, ‘systemic’ approach
to the applicability of Article XX exceptions developed by theWTO dispute settlement bodies,
and sheds light on the implications of such approach with respect to the relationship between
GATT 1994 andWTO obligations arising from different instruments of theWTOAgreement,
such as new members’ accession protocols. It also suggests that an exception to this general
approach could be envisaged when the fundamental environmental goals protected under Article
XX b) and g) are at stake.
1 INTRODUCTION
On 23 July 2012, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a Panel under
the requests of the United States, the European Union and Japan1 in order to rule
with respect to China’s export restrictions on various forms of rare earth
elements, tungsten and molybdenum.2 It is the second time that China’s export
* Ph.D. Candidate, International Law and Economics, Bocconi University. Special thanks go to Gary
Horlick, Professor Giorgio Sacerdoti and Professor Elena Sciso for their constant encouragement
and their useful comments on earlier versions of this article.
1 See WT/DS431/6, WT/DS432/6 and WT/DS433/6. The three complainants requested the
establishment of a single panel in accordance with Art. 9.1 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Apr. 15, 1994), Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1226 (Apr. 15,
1994)[hereinafter DSU]. The dispute settlement consultations had been requested on Mar. 13, 2012
(WT/DS431/1,WT/DS432/1 and WT/DS433/1).
2 According to the US Geological Survey, rare earth elements are a set of seventeen elements in the
periodic table, namely fifteen elements belonging to the family of lanthanides plus scandium and
yttrium. These elements play a critical role in the development of many high technology goods
and environmental technologies in that they are essential inputs to the manufacture of items such
as hybrid vehicles, mobile telephones, computers, televisions and energy efficient lights, wind
power generators, and military applications. Tungsten is indispensable for a variety of electrical
applications, and molybdenum for a number of metallurgical applications. See United States
Espa, Ilaria. ‘The Appellate Body Approach to the Applicability of Article XX GATT In the Light of
China – Raw Materials:A Missed Opportunity? ’. Journal of World Trade 46, no. 6 (2012):
1399–1424.
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regime on raw materials is challenged after the Panel and the Appellate Body
rulings in China – Raw Materials.3
The filing of a second dispute concerning China’s restrictions on the
exportation of raw materials reflects the mounting tension between China, on the
one hand, and industrialized resource-scarce countries, on the other, over access to
critical minerals and metals.4 Bejing’s quasi monopolistic position in terms of
worldwide production and export market share of crucial industrial primary
commodities5 has, in fact, rendered its most influential trade partners particularly
keen to ensure China’s compliance with the commitments undertaken in virtue of
its participation to the multilateral trading system and, notably, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 19946 and the so-called ‘WTO-plus’ obligations7
Geological Survey, Minerals Yearbook, various metals and minerals, various years, available at
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/myb/.
3 Panel Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (July 5, 2011) [hereinafter Panel Report] and
Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R (Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Appellate
Body Report].
4 In particular, the WTO members parties to both disputes, the United States and the European
Union, identified rare earths, together with a plurality of other industrial high-tech minerals and
metals, as critical to their industrial sector. See National Research Council, Minerals, Critical
Minerals and the US Economy, The National Academies Press (Washington, DC: The National
Academies Press, 2008); Critical Raw Materials for the EU, Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Defining Critical Raw Materials (July 30, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/rawmaterials/documents/index_en.htm. Accordingly, they
have consistently denounced China’s export regime on strategic minerals and metals as reflecting
an aggressive industrial policy aimed at boosting economic development by discriminating in
favour of the Chinese downstream producers and thereby shifting the traditional trade structure
toward the manufacturing sector. It has to be noted, however, that the criticality attributed to the
access to the challenged materials does not always stem from an absolute scarcity. Indeed, at least
in the case of the United States, the ‘resource-scarce’ label refers to the current geographical
concentration of production of the challenged materials, while it does not reflect the worldwide
distribution of known reserves. For instance, with respect to rare earths and molybdenum, the
United States ranks, respectively, third and second in terms of worldwide known reserves,
accounting for, respectively, 9.10% and 28.35%. See Jane Korinek & Jeonghoi Kim, Export
Restrictions on Strategic Raw Materials and Their Impacts on Trade and Global Supply, 45(2) J.World Trade
255 at 259–261 (2011).
5 Currently, China is by far the major worldwide supplier of all the challenged materials, producing
respectively 97.45% of rare earths, 80.07% of tungsten, and 41.65% of molybdenum on the global
market. See World Mining Data (2011), available at http://www.wmc.org.pl/sites/default/
files/WMD2011.pdf.
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Apr. 15, 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187, 33 ILM 1153 [hereinafter GATT
1994].
7 The so-called ‘WTO-plus’ obligations are additional, country-specific obligations not otherwise
contemplated in the Multilateral Agreements to which newly WTO acceding Members commit to
abide by in the process of negotiation of their terms of accession with the incumbent WTO
Members. Julia Ya Qin, ‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and their Implications for the World Trade Organization
Legal System – An appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37(3) J.WorldTrade 483 at 483–522 (2003).
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contained in the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China8
and the related provisions of the Report of theWorking Party on the Accession of
China.9 More generally, however, it is symptomatic of the growing concerns over
the proliferation in the use of trade-restrictive measures on the exportation of
strategic raw materials by China and other key major players,10 within a context
of well-recognized deficiency inWTO regulation.11
In this perspective, the approach developed by the dispute settlement bodies
in China – Raw Materials merits great attention for two main reasons. First, by
addressing the most controversial issues with regards to the consistency of China’s
unique regime on export restraints with the WTO Agreement, the Panel and the
Appellate Body clarified the scope of, and the interactions between, the main
GATT provisions relevant to export restrictions (i.e.,Article XI and Article XX) –
some of which (e.g., Article XI:2(a)) had never been interpreted before. Second,
and most importantly, by exploring China’s specific commitments on export
duties, they shed light on the ‘systemic’ relationship between GATT 1994 and
different instruments of the WTO Agreement, with particular regards to the
availability of Article XX defences for violations of WTO obligations, such as the
‘WTO plus’ commitments contained in new members’ accession protocols, falling
outside the scope of the GATT 1994.
The relevance of the comprehensive framework defined in China – Raw
Materials with regards to the reach of theWTO discipline on export restraints has
already been examined in detail and will not be the focus of this article.12 Rather,
8 Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic
of China,WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter China’s Accession Protocol].
9 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49 and
WT/ACC/CHN/49 [hereinafter China’s Accession Working Party Report].
10 In the latest years, a general intensification in the use of export restrictions has been registered for
all sectors of trade in natural resources. See World Trade Organization (WTO), World Trade
Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources (WTO, Geneva 2010); Jeonghoi Kim, Recent Trends in
Export Restrictions on Raw Materials, in Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), The Economic Impact of Export Restrictions on Raw Materials (OECD,
Paris 2010); and, for the latest developments, the most recent trade monitoring reports issued by
the Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, to the WTO’s Trade Policy Review, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/trdev_arc_e.htm (last access, July 20, 2012). Export
restrictions on ‘strategic’ minerals and metals, in particular, have increased by the highest incidence
with respect to any other sector. In the case of export duties, for instance, seventeen countries
imposed export restrictions on mineral products and metals in the period 1995–2002, whereas, in
the period 2003–2009, twenty-eight countries resorted to such measures.
11 For a critical discussion on the shortcomings of the GATT discipline on export restrictions see
Baris Karapinar, Export Restrictions and theWTO Law: How to Reform the ‘Regulatory Deficiency’, 45(6) J
WorldTrade 1139, at 1139–1155 (2012).
12 For a thorough analysis of the legal boundaries incumbent on WTO Members on the use of
export restrictions, and the role of guidance of WTO case law – especially of China – Raw
Materials – played in this respect see Baris Karapinar,Defining the Legal Boundaries of Export Restrictions:
A Case Law Analysis, 15(2) J Intl. Econ. L. 443–479 (2011).
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this article seeks to investigate the implications of the approach to the applicability
of Article XX GATT defined in China – Raw Materials with respect to some
underlying problems at the core of the functioning of the multilateral trading
system, namely the systemic relationship between GATT Article XX and WTO
obligations contained in other components of the WTO Agreement, and to draw
some critical comments on the opportunity of the conclusions reached by the
Appellate Body. This article is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the
reasoning adopted in China – Raw Materials to found the decision on the
non-availability of Article XX exceptions for violations of China’s WTO-plus
commitments on the use of export duties;13 section 3 discusses the more general
approach developed by the dispute settlement bodies to the applicability of Article
XX for violations of WTO-plus obligations on export restraints contained in the
accession protocols and, more generally, for violations of obligations falling outside
the scope of the GATT 1994, and analyses the implications of this approach for
China in the light of the new dispute on rare earths, as well as for other members
assuming WTO-plus commitments in this respect; section 4 investigates whether
alternative venues could have been explored by the DSB tribunals so as to rule in
favour of the availability of Article XX exceptions in the light of the fundamental
non-trade concerns invoked, i.e., the public health and conservation goals
protected under Article XX b) and g) of the GATT 1994.
2 CHINA’S WTO-PLUS COMMITMENTS ON EXPORT DUTIES
AND THE NON-AVAILABILITY OF ARTICLE XX GATT IN
CHINA: RAW MATERIALS
Under the GATT 1994, WTO Members are not under any obligation with
regards to the use of export duties. Article XI:I, in fact, provides for a general
obligation to refrain from all prohibitions and quantitative restrictions on exports
but leaves the possibility to institute or maintain export taxes and duties regardless
of their rationale.14
13 It has to be noted that, in addition to the challenges specifically regarding certain export duties
maintained by China, the Panel was requested to make findings on a wider set of allegations,
encompassing the use of export quotas and various other measures relating to the administration
of export quotas, the allocation of export quotas, and the publication of export quota amounts, as
well as export licensing requirements, minimum export price requirements, and fees and
formalities. However, this article will focus on the approach adopted in China – Raw Materials with
regards to China’s commitments on export duties, for the reasoning developed by the Panel and the
Appellate Body in this respect has relevant implications for the applicability of Art. XX of the GATT
1994.
14 According to Art. XI:I of the GATT 1994, ‘No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product or the
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Against this general framework, some newly acceding WTO Members have
agreed to abide by country-specific obligations on the use of export duties that do
not otherwise exist for originalWTO Members on the basis of GATT within the
context of their accession negotiations.15 Among them, China has undertaken a
stringent regime on export duties by terms of paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession
Protocol and the related provisions of the Working Party Report. This provision
severely limits the possibility for China to apply export restrictions, and has also
been interpreted by the WTO dispute settlement bodies as to pre-empt China
from resorting to GATT Article XX defences for violations of the obligations
therein.
2.1 THE INCONSISTENCY OF CHINA’S EXPORT DUTIES ON VARIOUS FORMS OF RAW
MATERIALS WITH PARAGRAPH 11. 3 OF CHINA’S ACCESSION PROTOCOL
China’s obligation to eliminate export duties arises exclusively from paragraph
11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol and the related provisions of the Working
Party Report.16 Under paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol, China has
agreed upon a general obligation to eliminate all taxes and charges applied to
exports, unless the restrictions in question are applied in conformity with Article
VIII of the GATT 199417 or to the eighty-four products listed in Annex 6 of the
Accession Protocol.18 According to the Note to Annex 6, the applied export duty
on listed products may be increased insofar as it does not exceed the maximum
rate indicated for each product in the Annex when ‘exceptional circumstances’
occur and only after consultation with the affected parties.19
Accordingly, in China – Raw Materials the European Union, the United States
and Mexico challenged the duties that China maintained on various forms of
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party’ (emphasis added).
15 For an overview of the WTO-plus commitments on export duties of new members and a critical
discussion of their general implications in the light of the approach developed in China – Raw
Materials with regards to the availability of Art. XX defences, see infra, at sec. 3.3.
16 For the identification of the relevant provisions of theWorking Party Report see infra nn.37 and 43.
17 Article VIII allows WTO Members to impose, at the border, a wide range of fees or charges
insofar as they are limited in amount to the approximate costs of services rendered and that they
are imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation.
18 Paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol reads: ‘China shall eliminate all taxes and charges
applied to exports unless specifically provided for Annex 6 of this Protocol or applied in
conformity with the provisions of Art.VIII of the GATT 1994’.
19 Annex 6 to China’s Accession Protocol, entitled ‘Products Subject to Export Duty’, lists
eighty-four different products (each identified by an eight-digit Harmonized System number) for
which maximum levels of export duty are provided. According to the Note to Annex 6, ‘China
confirmed that the tariff levels included in this Annex are maximum levels which will not be
exceeded. China confirmed furthermore that it would not increase the presently applied rates,
except under exceptional circumstances. If such circumstances occurred, China would consult with
affected members prior to increasing applied tariffs with a view to finding a mutually acceptable
solution.’
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bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon metal, yellow phosphorous,
and zinc,20 claiming that they constituted a breach of paragraph 11.3 of China’s
Protocol of Accession.
The Panel and the Appellate Body expressed no doubt on the inconsistency
of the challenged measures with paragraph 11.3.21 In particular, the AB clarified
that the language of paragraph 11.3, read in conjunction with the Annex 6 and the
Note to Annex 6 clearly indicates that: (i) China cannot apply export duties on
products not listed in Annex 6;22 (ii) the ‘exceptional circumstances’ provided for
in the Note to Annex 6 cannot be invoked to impose export duties on non-listed
products;23 (iii) in the case of the eighty-four listed products, China could increase
the applied export duties only up to the maximum rate set out in Annex 624 by
invoking the ‘exceptional circumstances’ exception provided for in the Note to
Annex 6, but only insofar as it fulfils the prior consultation requirement.25
Within such a framework, what becomes critical is whether the challenged
measures are maintained on products listed in Annex 6 of China’s Accession
Protocol or not. In the case at issue, the challenged export duties were applied on
products not listed in Annex 6, thus producing a violation of paragraph 11.3 of
China’s Protocol of Accession.26 The only exception was represented by the
‘special’ export duty of 50% applied on yellow phosphorus in addition to the
20 The specific forms of the raw materials subject to the complainants’ claims can be found at para.
2.2 of the Panel Report.
21 Panel Report, para. 7.105. The Appellate Body, called by China to reverse the Panel’s finding on
the non-availability of Art. XX, never questioned the inconsistency of China’s measures with para.
11.3, thereby upholding the Panel’s conclusion.
22 According to the Appellate Body, ‘Paragraph 11.3 requires China to eliminate taxes and charges
applied to exports unless such taxes and charges are “specifically provided for in Annex 6” of China’s
Accession Protocol’.Appellate Body Report, para. 284 (emphasis added).
23 The Appellate Body notes that ‘The Note to Annex 6 clarifies that the maximum rates set out in
Annex 6 “will not be exceeded” and that China will “not increase the presently applied rates
except under exceptional circumstances”. The Note therefore indicates that China may increase
the “presently applied rates” on the 84 products listed in Annex 6 to level that remain within the
maximum levels listed in the Annex’.Appellate Body Report, para. 284 (emphasis added).
24 See Appellate Body Report, para. 285. This is because the word ‘furthermore’ in the second
sentence of the Note to Annex 6 was interpreted by the Appellate Body as indicating that the
obligation contained in the second and third sentence of the Note, i.e., the ‘exceptional
circumstances’ requirement and the consultation requirement, are ‘in addition to China’s
obligation under the first sentence not to exceed the maximum tariff levels provided for in Annex
6’. Appellate Body Report, para. 287.
25 With regard to the obligation of prior consultation with the affected Members, it should be noted that
the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding that ‘China acted inconsistently with its obligations
underAnnex 6 because it failed to consult with other affected WTO Members prior to imposing export
duties on the raw materials at issue’ (Panel Report, para. 7.104).TheAppellate Body found that, since the
raw materials at issue were not included in Annex 6, ‘the consultation requirements contained in the
Note to Annex 6 are not applicable’.Appellate Body Report, para. 287.
26 The Appellate Body clarified that challenged export duties regulated under para. 11.3 of China’s
Accession Protocol do not fall within the scope of Art. VIII. Appellate Body Report, para. 290.
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‘regular’ export duty of 20% provided for in Annex 6 but, regrettably, the Panel
made no findings with respect to the measure at issue because it considered it fell
outside of its terms of reference.27
2.2 THE NON-AVAILABILITY OF ARTICLE XX GATT FOR VIOLATIONS OF CHINA’S
WTO-PLUS OBLIGATIONS ON EXPORT DUTIES
China did not contest that the challenged export duties resulted in a breach of
paragraph 11.3, but invoked the ‘environmental’ defences provided for in Article
XX (b) and (g) of the GATT 199428 to justify them, arguing that paragraph 11.3
and the related provisions of the Working Party Report and the reference to
‘exceptional circumstances’ in Annex 6 would support its right to resort to GATT
Article XX.29 The complainants, however, maintained that China was to be a priori
precluded from invoking Article XX for violations of paragraph 11.3.30
Hence, a key issue addressed in China – Raw Materials concerned the
availability of the defences provided for in Article XX of the GATT 1994 for
violations of China’s WTO-plus commitments on export duties as identified in
paragraph 11.3 of China’s Protocol of Accession and the related provisions of the
Working Party Report. Following a ‘standard’ interpretative methodology based on
the customary rules of interpretation of international law,31 the Panel and the
27 See Panel Report, paras. 7.69–7.71.
28 Article XX (b) of the GATT 1994 permits WTO Members to resort to otherwise
GATT-inconsistent measures when ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’;
Art. XX(g) allows WTO Members to adopt measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption’ even if they may result in violations of GATT provisions. Measures
falling within the scope of either exception have also to comply with the requirements established
in the chapeau of Art. XX, i.e., they cannot be ‘applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’. For a critical discussion on the
implications of the particular ‘force’ of the exceptions invoked, see infra, at sec. 4.3. China invoked
Art. XX (b) to justify a temporary export duty on various forms of coke, magnesium, manganese, and
Art. XX (g) to defend a temporary export duty imposed to various forms of fluorspar. Panel Report,
para. 7.237 and related chart. However, China did not seek to justify export duties imposed on
bauxite, manganese ores and concentrates and silicon metal under any of these general exceptions.
Panel Report, para. 7.227.
29 Panel Report, para. 7.110.
30 Panel Report, para. 7.108.
31 According to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, the dispute settlement system serves ‘… to clarify the existing
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law’. The dispute settlement bodies have thus traditionally applied the general rule of
interpretation as codified by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
[done at Vienna, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 33; 8 ILM 679]. The Appellate Body clarified such
methodology in US – Shrimp: ‘A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the
particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their
context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought.Where the
meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the
correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as
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Appellate Body both considered that a textual interpretation of paragraph 11.3,
read in the context provided by the relevant provisions of China’s Working Party
Report,32 permits to conclude that there is no legal basis for China to invoke the
Article XX exceptions to justify export duties found to be inconsistent with
paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol.33
The Panel and the Appellate Body reached this conclusion by noting, first,
that the language found in paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol expressly
includes, on the one hand,ArticleVIII of the GATT 1994 but, on the other, leaves
out reference to any other specific provisions of the GATT 1994 available as
exceptions such as Article XX,34 as well as any general references to the WTO
Agreement that could be interpreted as indicating that paragraph 11.3
incorporates the flexibilities of GATT Article XX, in contrast to other Paragraphs
of China’s Accession Protocol.35 Then, they found support for this interpretation
in the context provided by the other sub-paragraphs of paragraph 11 – which both
include the phrase ‘in conformity with the GATT 1994’36 – and by the relevant
provisions of the Working Party Report, which analogously prohibit the use of
export duties providing for the same set of specific exceptions – those covered in
Annex 6 and in GATT Article VIII – without incorporating any GATT 1994
flexibilities.37
a whole may usefully be sought’. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Oct. 12, 1998),WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 114.
32 According to the Panel, the provisions of the Working Party Report contribute to ‘shed light on
the interpretation to be given to related provisions of the Working Party Report or China’s
Accession Protocol’. Panel Report, para. 7.144.
33 Panel Report, para. 7.160; Appellate Body Report, para. 307.
34 Panel Report, paras. 7.126-9. Appellate Body Report, para. 291. Moreover, the Appellate Body
clarified that the reference to Art. VIII in para. 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol cannot be
interpreted, as China had claimed (see China’s appellant’s submission, para. 225), to confirm the
availability of Art. XX of the GATT 1994 in that the matter governed by the two provisions are
different. See supra n. 26. According to the AB, in fact, ‘the fact that Article XX may be invoked to
justify those fees and charges regulated under ArticleVIII does not mean that it can also be invoked to
justify export duties, which are not regulated under ArticleVIII’.Appellate Body Report, para. 290.
35 Panel Report, para. 7.124 and Appellate body Report, para. 304. The reference is to para. 5.1 of
China’s Accession Protocol whose language had been considered by the Appellate Body to allow
China to resort to Art. XX in China – Audiovisuals. See infra, at sec. 3.1.
36 Panel Report, paras. 7.136-8 and Appellate Body Report, para. 293.
37 Both the Panel and the Appellate Body identified paras. 155 and 156 of China’s Working Party
Report as the relevant context for para. 11.3 of the Accession Protocol in contrast with China,
which had insisted on the relevance of para. 170. According to China, the latter had to be
regarded as the relevant context for para. 11.3 for it had the same heading (‘Taxes and Charges
Levied on Import and Exports’) and read: ‘Upon Accession, China would ensure that its laws and
regulations relating to all fees, charges or taxes levied on imports and exports would be in full
conformity with its WTO obligations, including Arts. I, III:2 and 4, and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
…’ – thus incorporating a general reference to the WTO Agreement. However, the Panel and the
Appellate Body considered that para. 170, inserted in sec. D of the Working Party Report dealing
with ‘Internal Policies Affecting Foreign Trade in Goods’, referred to domestic charges and taxes
levied on imports and exports, and thus merely repeated the commitments existing under certain
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Hence, they concluded that:
the deliberate choice of language providing for exceptions in Paragraph 11.3, together with
the omission of general references to theWTO Agreement or to the GATT 1994, suggest that
the WTO Members and China did not intend to incorporate into Paragraph 11.3 the
defences set out in Article XX of the GATT 1994.38
Nor, being the challenged measures applied on non-listed products, the reference
to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ in Note to Annex 6 could play any role in
supporting China’s right to invoke the defences of Article XX.39
3 THE ‘SYSTEMIC’RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GATT 1994 AND
DIFFERENT INSTRUMENTS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT
The conclusion reached on the non-availability of Article XX defences for
violation of paragraph 11.3 permitted to shed light on some unexplored provisions
of China’s Accession Protocol and the relatedWorking Party Report with regards
to China’s unique obligations on the elimination of export duties. However, its
importance goes beyond that, for the decision on the non-availability of Article
XX does not arise out of an ad hoc reasoning developed with respect to paragraph
11.3 only, but directly stems from a more general framework of reference on the
relationship between the GATT 1994 and the different instruments of the WTO
Agreement.The dispute settlement bodies made in fact clear that access to GATT
Article XX defences for violations of obligations falling outside the scope of the
GATT 1994 is conditioned to the incorporation therein of language to that effect.
Such conclusion carries important implications for newly acceding members
which have agreed to abide by WTO-plus obligations by terms of their accession
protocols. Among them, China seems to have accepted a particularly severe
regime, although other countries have also agreed upon additional substantive
obligations.While the analysis of the implications of the approach developed in
China – Raw Materials with regards to the whole body of WTO-plus obligations is
GATT rules; on the contrary, paras. 155 and 156 of the Working Party Report, which fall under
section C ‘Export Regulations’ and deal solely with the commitment undertaken by China with
respect to the elimination of export duties, constitute the relevant context for para. 11.3 of the
Accession Protocol, which specifically deals with the prohibition on the use of export duties that does
not otherwise exist in the GATT 1994. Paragraph 155 reads: ‘taxes and charges should be eliminated
unless applied in conformity with GATT Article VIII or listed in Annex 6 to the Draft Protocol’.
Paragraph 156 confirms:‘China noted that the majority of products were free of export duty, although
84 items, including tungsten ore, ferrosilicon and some aluminium products, were subject to export
duties’. Panel Report, paras. 7.130-7.148. See also Appellate Body Report, paras. 294-9.
38 Panel Report, para. 7.129 (emphasis added). The Panel further reiterated: ‘If China and WTO
Members wanted the defences of GATT Article XX to be available to violations of China’s
export duty commitments, they could have said so in paragraph 11.3 or elsewhere in China’s
Accession Protocol’. Para. 7.140. See also Appellate Body Report, para. 293.
39 Appellate Body Report, para. 284.
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beyond the scope of this article, this sections will provide with an overview of the
implications of such approach for the obligations undertaken by new members on
the use of export duties.
3.1 THE LINK BETWEEN ARTICLE XX GATT AND WTO-PLUS PROVISIONS
China – Raw Materials was not the first dispute arisen on the basis of a claim of
violation of China’s Accession Protocol,40 not even with regard to the availability
of Article XX as a defence for violations of China’s WTO-plus obligations. A
similar matter was addressed in China – Audiovisuals.41 In that occasion, the
Appellate Body ruled in favour of the applicability of Article XX of GATT 1994
for violations of China’s WTO-plus commitment on state trading contained in
paragraph 5.1.The AB’s conclusion was based on the wording of the introductory
clause of paragraph 5.1 – ‘without prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade in a
manner consistent with the WTO Agreement’ –, which the Appellate Body
interpreted to mean that the defences provided for in Article XX were available,
by way of incorporation, for violations of the commitments provided for in that
paragraph.42 No further consequences were drawn, however, on the more general
question of the relationship between the Accession Protocol(s) and the GATT
1994.
In China – Raw Materials, the Panel further developed such approach and, by
drawing a contrast between paragraph 5.1 and paragraph 11.3 of China’s
Accession Protocol, clarified that there was no legal basis for applying GATT
Article XX with regards to China’sWTO-plus commitments on the export duties
in that paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol and related provisions of the
Working Party Report43 lack any reference to Article XX of the GATT 1994 as
40 Indeed, China-specific provisions have been the matter of contention in various disputes. See, for
instance, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339, WT/DS340 and
WT/DS341, and WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R and WT/DS341/AB/R; and China –
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and
Audiovisual Entertainment Products,WT/DS363 and WT/DS363/AB/R (both involving China as
respondent).
41 Ibid.
42 China – Audiovisuals,Appellate Body Report, para. 230. It is noteworthy to recall that the AB reversed
the Panel interpretation. See Baris Karapinar, supra n. 12, at 462.
43 It should be noted that China’s insistence upon the relevance of paragraph 170 of Working Party
Report as the context for paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol (see supra n. 37) was
motivated by the intent to establish that paragraph 170 had to be equated with paragraph 5.1 so as to
allow recourse to Art. XX of the GATT 1994. Panel Report, para. 7.138 and Appellate Body Report,
para. 291. As known, paragraph 170 reads: ‘Upon Accession, China would ensure that its laws and
regulations relating to all fees, charges or taxes levied on imports and exports would be in full
conformity with its WTO obligations, including Articles I, III:2 and 4, and XI:1 of the GATT 1994
…’. China maintained that the phrase ‘in full conformity with itsWTO obligations, including …’ had
to be regarded as synonymous with the introductory clause contained in paragraph 5.1 of the
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well as any general reference to the flexibilities of the GATT 1994 or the WTO
Agreement.44 The Appellate Body, confronted with China’s request to reverse the
Panel’s conclusion, confirmed that no legal basis could be found to allow China to
resort to Article XX defences failing in paragraph 11.3 any reference to GATT
XX, either specifically or by means of a general reference to the GATT 1994 or
theWTOAgreement such as in paragraph 5.1.45
The importance of the conclusion reached in China – Raw Materials lies in
the fact that the decision on the non-availability of Article XX is not an automatic
reflection of the existence of a WTO-plus obligation as such but of the way a
WTO-plus commitment is expressly formulated (i.e., the language of paragraph
11.3). In other words, the dispute settlement bodies have made clear that access to
the GATT Article XX defences for WTO-plus obligations could be granted only
insofar as language to that effect was incorporated therein or elsewhere in the
Accession Protocol by way of reference. The reasoning adopted in China – Raw
Materials is thus formulated in such as way as to be applicable not only to China’s
WTO-plus commitments on export duties, but also to the additional substantive
obligations which other new members may have agreed upon in their accession
protocols, not necessarily – and anyways not uniquely – on the use of export
duties.
3.2 CONT.: THE LINK BETWEEN ARTICLE XX GATT AND OTHER COMPONENTS OF
THE WTO AGREEMENT
The conclusion reached in China – Raw Materials did not arise out of an ad hoc
reasoning developed with respect to paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol
only, but it directly stemmed from a more comprehensive reasoning which the
dispute settlement bodies applied to a WTO-plus obligation such as paragraph
11.3 in the light of the legal status of the accession protocols as integral parts of
WTOAgreement.46
Accession Protocol in that the term ‘including’ would have to be interpreted as if the list of provisions
was not exhaustive. China argued in fact that ‘any flexibilities that paragraph 170 affords to China to
adopt otherwise WTO-inconsistent export “taxes” and “charges” must extend equally to paragraph
11.3’. China’s appellant submission, para. 246. However, the Panel considered that paragraph 170
could not be equated with paragraph 5.1 and the Appellate Body upheld this conclusion. Panel
Report, paras. 7.130-7.148 and Appellate Body Report, para. 291.
44 Panel Report, para. 7.147 and Appellate Body Report, para. 304.
45 Appellate Body, para. 307.
46 As the Panel reiterated, the accession protocols, altogether with the commitments included in the
Working Party Report that are incorporated therein by cross-reference, are an integral component
of the WTO Agreement. This is also why WTO Members can initiate WTO dispute settlement
proceedings on the basis of a claim of violation of China’s Accession Protocol. Panel Report,
paras. 7.111-5. See, for instance, the language of paragraph 1.2 of China’s Accession Protocol and
paragraph 342 of the Working Party Report, incorporated into the former.
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Indeed, in China – Raw Materials the Panel clarified the reach of Article XX
of the GATT 1994 and the criteria to determine whether and to what extent
Article XX defences can be invoked for violations of obligations falling outside of
the GATT 1994. According to the Panel, Article XX defences are by default
available only for GATT violations and there is no such ‘umbrella clause’ in the
WTO Agreement which would allow WTO Members to resort to Article XX
GATT for violations of any provision of theWTO Agreement.The Panel reached
this conclusion by observing that ‘each WTO agreement provides for its own set
of exceptions or flexibilities applicable to the specific obligations found in each
covered agreement’47 and that the language of the introductory phrase of Article
XX – ‘nothing in this Agreement should be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement of …’ – seems to exclude the direct applicability of Article XX to
other components of theWTOAgreement.48
However, the Panel did not exclude ab absoluto that Article XX would not be
available for violations of obligations falling outside the scope of the GATT 1994.
Rather, noting that WTO Members have, on occasion, incorporated Article XX
defences into other instruments of theWTO Agreement by way of reference,49 it
concluded that access to Article XX GATT can be granted for violations of
non-GATT obligations insofar as language to that effect is incorporated therein by
cross-reference. In other words, the legal basis for applying GATT Article XX
exceptions to obligations arising out of other components of theWTOAgreement
is, as reiterated by the Appellate Body,50 the very text of the incorporation.
Hence, the importance of China – Raw Materials lies in the fact that the
dispute settlement bodies did not just rule on the non-availability of Article XX
exceptions for violations of paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol on the
basis of its specific wording, but framed this decision within a more general,
‘systemic’ approach to the applicability of Article XX GATT. This approach not
only shed light on the relationship between GATT 1994 and the additional
obligations contained in the accession protocols, but contributed to clarify, more
generally, the relationship between Article XX GATT and otherWTO obligations
arising from different instruments of the WTO Agreement. According to this
framework, China’s commitment under paragraph 11.3 is regarded as a WTO
obligation falling outside the scope of the GATT 1994, the violation of which
could only be justified insofar as language to that effect was incorporated therein.
47 Panel Report, para. 7.150.
48 According to the Panel, ‘A priori, the reference to this Agreement suggests that the exceptions therein
relate only to GATT 1994, and not to other provisions’. Panel Report, para. 7.153.
49 See, e.g., the TRIMs Agreement, whose Art. 3 states: ‘All exceptions under GATT 1994 shall
apply, as appropriate, to the provisions of this Agreement’. Panel Report, para. 7.153.
50 Appellate Body Report, para. 303.
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3.3 THE RARE EARTHS DISPUTE AND BEYOND: GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA
AND OTHER WTO MEMBERS ASSUMING WTO-PLUS OBLIGATIONS ON EXPORT
DUTIES
On the basis of the approach followed in China – Raw Materials, China’s margin of
manoeuvre to institute export duties appears severely limited.The interpretation of
paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol given by the Panel and the
Appellate Body has, in particular, relevant implications for the new dispute on rare
earths. The export duties challenged by the European Union, the United States
and Japan under paragraph 11.3 are in fact imposed on materials not listed in
Annex 6 of China’s Accession Protocol with the only exception of certain forms
of tungsten.51 China’s export duties on rare earths and molybdenum are thus to
be presumed in breach of paragraph 11.3. In the case of the export duty applied
on tungsten, China could in principle invoke the occurrence of the ‘exceptional
circumstances’ mentioned in the Note to Annex 6 as long as it is not in excess of
the maximum rate of 20% provided for in Annex 6. Such scenario would prove
very interesting in that it would allow for clarification of the scope of this
exception.52 Indeed, whereas the AB clarified in China – Raw Materials that China
could not invoke the Article XX defences to justify export duties on listed
products in excess of the maximum levels set-forth in Annex 6,53 it did not,
specify whether and, if so, to what extent, the scope of the ‘exceptional
circumstances’ requirement for listed products which are not in excess of the
maximum Annex 6 levels may be considered to overlap with the scope of Article
XX of the GATT 1994, as China argued.54 In any case, however, chances that
China may be successful in invoking the ‘exceptional circumstances’ justification
are almost null since it reportedly did not fulfil the additional prior consultation
requirement set out in the Note to Annex 6.55
China’s export duties on rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum are thus very
likely to be found in breach of paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol,
regardless of the proclaimed environmental protection and conservation rationale
to which China has continuously referred to, making explicit reference to Article
51 See the list of the challenged items, identified by the HS number, in the request for the
establishment of the Panel in WT/DS431/6,WT/DS432/6 and WT/DS433/6.
52 We recall that, in China – Raw Materials, the ‘exceptional circumstances’ venue could have applied
solely with regards to the special duty on yellow phosphorus. However, this option remained
unexplored for the Panel made no findings on the measure at issue on the basis of the terms of
reference argument. See supra n. 27 and the corresponding text.
53 Appellate Body Report, para. 284.
54 See Appellate Body Report, para. 282.
55 The export duties imposed on rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum have raised great concern
precisely because they were adopted unilaterally by China without any form of prior consultation.
See Bin Gu, Mineral Export Restraints and Sustainable Development, 14 J. Int’l Econ. Law 765
(2011), at 771-773.
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XX b) and g) of the GATT 1994.56 This venue is in fact a priori precluded in the
light of the approach developed in China – Raw Materials with regards to the
applicability of Article XX GATT.
China is not the only new Member to have agreed upon additional
obligations concerning the elimination of export duties. However, the severity of
the commitments undertaken in this regard varies greatly among countries. The
great majority of the accession protocols simply include a standard formula
according to which, from the date of accession, the country would apply its laws
and regulations governing export measures ‘in conformity with the relevant
provisions of the WTO’.57 In the light of the approach adopted in China – Raw
Materials, the language of this formula – which frequently includes express
reference to, inter alia, Article XX of the GATT 1994 – seems to leave to the new
members a significant margin of manoeuvre in the use of export duties,
comparable to that of the originalWTO Members.
In contrast to this general trend, three countries among the twenty-nine new
members appear to have undertaken, along with China, stringent commitments on
the use of export duties assuming detailed obligations to bind, phase down and/or
eliminate the export duties maintained on particular products within a certain
timeframe: Mongolia, Ukraine, and Russia.58 Significantly, however, Mongolia has
undertaken to eliminate solely the export duties imposed on raw cashmere which,
according to Mongolia itself, was maintained with the only intent to promote
downstream processing in the textile sector.59 This WTO-plus obligations is thus
quite narrow in scope and does not ‘deprive’ Mongolia from resorting to measures
aimed at addressing the legitimate non-economic goals recognized in Article XX
GATT, while leaving Mongolia free to recur to export duties with regards to any
other product regardless of the rationale.
Ukraine and the Russian Federation, on the contrary, have abided by
additional obligations which limit the use of export duties on a wide range of
products. In contrast with China, however, they appear to have successfully
negotiated some form of flexibilities apt to allow resort to GATT Article XX. In
the former case, an express reference to Article XX exceptions was incorporated
into the paragraph of the Working Party Report by terms of which Ukraine
agreed not to increase the export duties applied to a specific set of products nor to
56 See, for all, the Comments by Head of MOFCOM Department of Treaty and Law on US, EU
and Japan Requests of Consultations on China, May 15, 2012 (http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201203/20120308016675.html).
57 For a more detailed description of the section on ‘Export regulations’ generally contained in the
accession protocols, see Baris Karapinar, supra n. 12, at 458–459.
58 Ibid.
59 See Mongolia, Accession Working Party Report, WT/ACC/MNG/9, June 27, 1996, under the
heading ‘Export Measures’, at 12.
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apply other measures having an equivalent effect.60 In the latter case, Russia’s
commitment to bind the export duties on approximately 700 tariff lines is
accompanied by a general reference to the WTO Agreement similar in language
with that of paragraph 5.1 of China’s Accession Protocol.61 In this respect, China
appears to be the only country to have agreed upon a particularly stringent regime
on the use of export duties which, on the basis of the approach adopted in China –
Raw Materials, pre-empts it from invoking Article XX defences.
4 ASSESSING THEAPPROPRIATENESS OF THE CHINA – RAW
MATERIALSAPPROACH TOARTICLE XX GATT: SHOULD
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS CHANGE THE PICTURE?
Under the approach delineated by the dispute settlement bodies in China – Raw
Materials, a Member may be entitled to resort to the defences provided for in
Article XX only for violations of the GATT 1994 provisions or when Article XX
justification has been incorporated by way of reference into the relevant part of
another WTO agreement. According to such approach, China is left with no
margin of manoeuvre to institute export duties on products non-listed in Annex
6, regardless of the rationale such measures may respond to. In the case at issue, as
well as in the new dispute of rare earths, China invoked in particular the
‘environmental’ defences provided for in Article XX b) and g) of the GATT 1994.
This section aims at investigating whether alternative venues could have been
explored by the Panel and the Appellate Body as to rule in favour of the
availability of Article XX exceptions for violations of provisions, such as paragraph
11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol, falling outside the scope of the GATT 1994,
60 Paragraph 240 of Ukraine’s Accession Working Party Report (WT/ACC/UKR/152) reads: ‘The
representative of Ukraine confirmed that at present export duties were applied only to the goods
listed in Table 20(a). He further confirmed that Ukraine would reduce export duties in accordance
with the binding schedule contained in Table 20(b). He also confirmed that as regards these
products, Ukraine would not increase export duties, nor apply other measures having an equivalent
effect, unless justified under the exceptions of the GATT 1994’ (emphasis added).
61 According to para. 638 of Russia’s Accession Working Party Report (WT/ACC/RUS/70): ‘…
from the date of accession,…products described in Part V of [the Schedule of Concessions and
Commitments on Goods of the Russian Federation] would, subject to the terms, conditions or
qualifications set-forth in that Part of the Schedule, be exempt from export duties in excess of
those set-forth and provided therein. The representative of the Russian Federation further
confirmed that the Russian Federation would not apply other measures having an equivalent effect
to export duties on those products. He confirmed that, from the date of accession, the Russian
Federation would apply export duties in conformity with theWTO Agreement, in particular with Article
I of the GATT 1994 . . . The representative of the Russian Federation confirmed that the Russian
Federation would, from the date of accession to the WTO, administer export tariff-rate quotas
(TRQs) in a manner that is consistent with theWTO Agreement and in particular the GATT 1994 and the
WTOAgreement on Import Licensing Procedures’ (emphasis added).
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and, in particular, whether a different result could be achieved in the light of the
fundamental non-trade concerns invoked.
4.1 AN AD HOC SOLUTION: A RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF WTO-PLUS
OBLIGATIONS
It has been suggested that an alternative solution could have been reached had the
dispute settlement bodies mitigated the traditional ‘textualistic’ approach by
adopting a more openly purposive interpretative methodology. The decision on
the non-availability of Article XX defences for violations of paragraph 11.3 of
China’s Accession Protocol, as mentioned, was rooted on the specific wording of
the provision at issue, read in its context.62 The appropriateness of this
methodology – which the Appellate Body had adopted with regards to China –
Audiovisuals as well – has been subject to increased controversy with regards to
disputes related to the specific nature and scope of Member-specific obligations,63
with particular regards to China’s uniqueWTO-plus obligations.64
In the case of China’s unique commitments, the ‘textualistic’ approach has
been criticized to ‘read China-specific obligations in clinical isolation with
generally applicable rules’,65 relying solely on the text and context of the
provisions at issue while leaving aside any consideration in the light of the object
and purpose of the provisions at issue or the covered agreements as a whole.This
62 See supra n. 31.
63 A growing chorus of critics has arisen denouncing the alleged inequity resulting from the
heterogeneous structure of the WTO membership, encompassing original Members and the
acceding Members. See, e.g., Xiaohui Wu, Case Note: China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (WT/
DS363/AB/R), 9 Chinese JIL 423 (2010), 423–432; Jose F. De Medeiros, Global Trade Law –
China’s Export Restraints Found To Be Inconsistent With Its Obligations As A Member Of The World Trade
Organization – China – Measures Related To The Exportation Of Various Raw Materials, 35 Suffolk
Transnat’l L. Rev. 203 at 203–219 (2012).
64 Some authors have pointed out that ‘China-specific commitments (i.e., accession terms that apply
to China alone) are unprecedented in the history of the WTO and are unparalleled by those
undertaken by any other acceding WTO member’. Xiaohui Wu, No Longer Outside, Not Yet Equal:
Rethinking China’s Membership in the World Trade Organization, 10 Chinese J. Int’l L. 227, 260 at 239
(2011). According to Nicholas Lardy, the accession terms negotiated by China are ‘so onerous that
they violate the fundamental principles of theWTO’, such as reciprocity and non-discrimination. See
Nicholas Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy 9 (Brookings Institution Press 2002). The
‘special’ terms of accession of China are the result of a controversial fifteen-year long process of
negotiation that required China to commit to a unique set of additional concessions in under to
overcome WTO Members’ concerns over China’s economic size and competitiveness and their
reluctance to admit into the system the largest trading nation with a transition economy and socialist
form of government. See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon:An Essay on China’sWTOAccession Saga, 15 Am.
U. ILR 1469–1538 (2000).
65 Xiaohui Wu, No Longer Outside, supra n. 64, at 260.
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‘void’ in the interpretation would ultimately risk jeopardizing the underlying
object and purpose of theWTOAgreement as a whole.66
Some authors have thus called for an interpretative approach based on a
restrictive interpretation of China-specific obligations,67 according to which, in
case of doubt,68 China’s limitations of sovereignty would have to be interpreted
narrowly in the light of the overall object and purpose of theWTOAgreement, in
order to preserve ‘the coherence and the integrity of theWTO legal system and its
fundamental principles’.69 In this perspective, China’s WTO-plus obligations
could not be interpreted to prevent China from resorting to Article XX defences.
Although the Appellate Body has adopted this approach at least once in the
EC – Hormones case,70 a major limit is that the principle of in dubio mitius is a
supplementary means of interpretation to which, according to customary rules of
interpretation as reflected in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, the dispute
settlement bodies should refer to only on a subordinate basis, i.e., in cases when
the application of the general rule established in Article 31 leaves the meaning
‘ambiguous or obscure’ or ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’.71 However, the
dispute settlement bodies did not find the language of paragraph 11.3 equivocal or
inconclusive.72 They neither found this interpretation unreasonable, provided that
it proved consistent with their interpretation of the relationship between
66 Ibid. It has been suggested that the reluctance of the Appellate Body to embrace any forms of
purposive interpretation ‘may have to do with the attitude of a young institution which must establish
its authority and with the reciprocal nature of the undertakings’. George Nolte, The Law beyond the
Vienna Convention 143 (Enzo Cannizzaro eds., Oxford University Press 2011).
67 The principle of restrictive interpretation (in dubio mitius) is a generally recognized supplementary
means of interpretation in international law which applies in deference to the sovereignty of States in
the sense that ‘[i]f the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less
onerous to the pat assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and personal
supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties’. Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts,Oppenheim’s International Law vol. I, at 1278 (Pearson Higher Education 1992).
68 According to this reasoning, the object and purpose of the WTO-plus provisions, at least in the
case of China, are unknown or questionable. Indeed, it has been noted that ‘[t]hroughout the
hundreds of pages of the Protocol and the Working Party Report there is not a single passage
setting forth the rationale or the object and purpose of such differential treatment of China’. See
JuliaYa Qin, supra n. 7, at 510.
69 Xiaohui Wu, supra n. 64, at 260.
70 In EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body stated: ‘We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended
to impose upon themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation by
mandating conformity or compliance with such standards, guidelines and recommendations.To sustain
such an assumption and to warrant such a far-reaching interpretation . . . language far more specific
and compelling . . . would be necessary’. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities –
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Jan. 16, 1998),WT/DS26/AB/R,WT/DS48/AB/R,
at 165. Recourse to restrictive interpretation has not, however, been applied consistently by the
Appellate Body. See Xiaohui Wu, supra n. 64, at 148.
71 For a through discussion on the hierarchical relationship between Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention and its character of general international law see Luigi Sbolci, The Law beyond the
Vienna Convention (Enzo Cannizzaro eds., Oxford University Press 2011), at 145 et seq.
72 Indeed, in China – Raw Materials the Panel pointed out that the language of paragraph 11.3 ‘can only
be understood to reflect agreement at the time of China’s accession that since China’s export duties
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Article XX of the GATT 1994 and the other components of the WTO
Agreement, according to which Members would be entitled to resort to the
defences provided for in Article XX only for violations of the GATT 1994
provisions or when Article XX justification is incorporated by way of reference
into the relevant part of another WTO agreement.73 Within such a framework,
little scope was left to the dispute settlement bodies to apply the restrictive
principle in favour of China’s sovereignty.74 Moreover, the appropriateness of this
approach seems affected by its ad hoc basis. China is in fact, as previously noted,
the only WTO Member that has agreed upon WTO obligations on the use of
export duties formulated in a way which, on the basis of the reasoning adopted in
China – Raw Materials, pre-empts recourse to Article XX exceptions. Such
circumstance, on the one hand, reinforces the ‘reasonableness’ of the decision on
the non-availability with respect to violations of paragraph 11.3 reached in China
– Raw Materials; on the other, it shows that the in dubio mitius approach would
then serve the sole purpose to relieve China from the impossibility to invoke
Article XX defences for violations of paragraph 11.3 rather than to offer a legally
sound framework of reference to guide the interpretation of WTO-plus
obligations, which is indeed the underlying goal of the comprehensive approach
developed in China – Raw Materials. Finally, the in dubio mitius approach seems in
contrast with the vision adopted in China – Raw Materials with regards to the
implications of the inherent right to regulate trade, according to which to allow
for the availability of Article XX when such a justification is not provided for as a
result of the negotiation of China’s terms of accession would ‘undermine the
predictability and legal security of the international trading system’.75
4.2 THE INHERENT AND SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO REGULATE TRADE
The Panel and the Appellate Body denied in China – Raw Materials that the
availability of Article XX defences for violations of non-GATT obligations not
incorporating any GATT 1994 flexibilities, such as paragraph 11.3 of China’s
Accession Protocol, could be inferred from the WTO Members’ inherent and
sovereign right to regulate trade as affirmed in the WTO Agreement ‘read as a
whole’.76
commitments arose exclusively from China’s Accession Protocol,Article XX would not apply to such
commitment’. Panel Report, para. 7.138 (emphasis added). See also Appellate Body Report, para. 306.
73 Panel Report, paras. 7.153-4 and Appellate Body Report, para. 306.
74 See infra, at sec. 4.2. It should also be noted that the Appellate Body did attempt to inform its
conclusion in the light of the underlying purpose of theWTO Agreement as a whole, by reference to
the legitimate goals proclaimed in the preamble. See infra, at sec. 4.3.
75 Panel Report, para. 7.159. See infra, at sec. 4.2.
76 Paragraph 7.155.
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China had maintained that the specific obligations accepted with regards to
export duties could not pre-empt it to exercise its right to regulate trade at least
with respect to the circumstances provided for in Article XX of GATT 1994.77 In
claiming so, it referred to China –Audiovisuals, where the Appellate Body admitted
that such right has an inherent character rather than being ‘bestowed by
international treaties such as theWTOAgreement’.78
However, the Panel clarified that the inherent right to regulate trade cannot
prevail overWTO rules intended to constrain the exercise of that right, for China
deliberately agreed upon those rules as an ‘ultimate expression of …sovereignty’.79
The Appellate Body further reiterated that in China – Audiovisuals the availability
of the Article XX exceptions did not arise out of the recognizance that China’s
inherent right to regulate trade was to prevail over the commitments agreed upon
in the Accession Protocol but was a direct consequence of the specific wording of
paragraph 5.1, which expressly incorporates reference to the WTO Agreement.80
Hence, the AB confirmed that the legal basis for applying Article XX of the
GATT 1994 to non-GATT obligations such as WTO-plus commitments is the
text incorporation by cross-reference and clarified that the inherent right to
regulate trade plays a role in this respect.
In rejecting China’s sovereignty arguments with respect to the availability of
Article XX defences, the Panel recognized that ‘the situation created by [paragraph
11.3] taken in isolation may be perceived as imbalanced’.81 However, the Panel
recalled that, in accordance with Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement,82 ‘the
negotiated agreement between the WTO membership and the acceding Member
results in a delicate balance of rights and obligations, which are reflected in the
77 Panel Report, para. 7.155. In the concluding statement given at the first substantive meeting,
China asserted: ‘China finds repugnant the argument that it has not only assumed uniquely
onerous obligations, but also that it is denied its “inherent power” to take measures in relation to
these uniquely onerous obligations to promote other fundamental interests, such as conservation
and public health. If this argument were accepted, China would be subject to uniquely onerous
obligations and would be deprived, again uniquely, of its “inherent power” to regulate trade’.
Executive Summary of the Opening Oral Statement by China at the First Substantive Meeting,
China – Raw Materials,WT/DS398/R/Add.1 (July 5, 2011), Annex D-2, para. 24.
78 China – Audiovisuals,Appellate Body Report, para. 222.
79 Panel Report, para. 7.157. Moreover, the Panel considered that ‘[t]his view is reinforced by the
fact that China and the WTO Members did make explicit reference to exceptions when they
intended to incorporate them’. Para. 7.147.
80 Appellate Body Report, para. 300.
81 Panel Report, para. 7.160 (emphasis added).
82 According to Art. XII of the Marrakesh Agreement, ‘[a]ny State may accede to this Agreement, on
terms to be agreed between it and theWTO’ (emphasis added).
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specific wording of each commitment set out in these documents.’83 Accordingly,
it concluded that:
[t]o allow such exceptions to justify a violation when no exception was apparently
envisaged or provided for would change the content and alter the careful balance achieved
in the negotiation, ultimately undermining the predictability and legal security of the
international trading system.84
The vision promoted by the Panel is, on a general basis, appreciable in that it
reconciles the disproportionality of China’s unique commitments on the use of
export duties with the multilateral nature of China’s accession package. In other
words, although paragraph 11.3 may in itself produce an imbalanced outcome, it is
but one obligation within the overall set of concessions that form the multilaterally
agreed package of China’s accession. In this perspective, the Panel’s approach
leaves little scope to justify a recourse to a restrictive interpretation of China’s
specific obligations on the elimination of export duties: according to this general
framework, in fact, China exercised its inherent and sovereign right to regulate
trade in negotiating the language of paragraph 11.3 in a way which prevents it
from resorting to Article XX as part of a mutually advantageous comprehensive
package which globally satisfied both China and the WTO membership.85 Such
conclusion, moreover, seems to find support in a comparison of the language of
paragraph 11.3 with the terms of accession agreed upon by the other new
members that undertook additional specific obligations on the use of export
duties.86 However, as I will argue below, this solution configures a ‘rigid’ approach
that fails to take into adequate consideration the particular relevance of the
fundamental interests invoked by China in the case at issue, i.e., the public health
and conservation goals recognized in Article b) and g) of the GATT 1994.
4.3 THE RIGHTS TO REGULATE TRADE TO ADDRESS FUNDAMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
As known, in China – Raw Materials China invoked the ‘environmental’ defences
provided for in Article b) and g) of the GATT 1994. In particular, China argued
during the appeal phase that its entitlement to recur to Article XX of the GATT
1994 for violations of paragraph 11.3, although not inferable from its specific
language on the basis of the Panel’s approach, was founded on its right to regulate
83 Panel Report, para. 7.112. The Panel further underlined that ‘[u]ltimately, the acceding Member
and the WTO Membership recognize that the intensively negotiated content of an accession
package in an “entry fee” to theWTO system’. Ibid. (emphasis added).
84 Panel Report, para. 7.159 (emphasis added).
85 Panel Report, para. 7.129.
86 See supra nn. 62 to 64 and corresponding text, at sec. 3.3.
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trade ‘in a manner that promotes conservation and public health’.87 In other
words, China tried to strengthen the inherent and sovereign right to regulate
argument by making specific reference to the fundamental nature of the non-trade
interests protected under Article XX b) and g)88 which, in addition to being
incorporated into other covered agreements containing an article that reproduces
the disciplines set out in Article XX GATT or refers to it, are also recognized in
the first recital of the preamble of theWTO Agreement as well as in the preamble
of many covered agreements.89
Interestingly, the Appellate Body did recognize that the proclaimed rationales
were legitimate non-trade goals falling within the scope of the underlying
objectives of WTO as stated in the preamble of the WTO Agreement,90 but
denied that the preamble could be interpreted as to provide a legal basis for
invoking Article XX defences for violations of a non-GATT provision, such as
paragraph 11.3, that does not incorporate any reference to Article XX flexibilities.
In the Appellate Body’s view, in fact, the language of the preamble does not
‘provid[e] specific guidance on the question of whether Article XX of the GATT
1994 is applicable to paragraph 11.3 of China’s Protocol of Accession’91 but rather
indicates that ‘the WTO Agreement, as a whole, …reflect[s] the balance struck by
WTO Members between trade and non-trade concerns’.92 Hence, the Appellate
Body upheld the vision expressed by the Panel on the limited effects ascribable to
the inherent right to regulate trade with respect to the applicability of Article XX
GATT, notwithstanding the fundamental relevance of the environmental interests
invoked by China in the case at issue.
Although the AB’s reasoning is internally coherent with the general approach
adopted with regards to the prerequisites for the availability of Article XX GATT,
87 Appellate Body Report, para. 300.
88 According to China, in particular, ‘the Panel distorted the balance of rights and obligations
established in China’s Accession Protocol by assuming that China had “abandoned” its right to
impose export duties “to promote fundamental non-trade-related interests, such as conservation
and public health”‘. Appellate Body Report, para. 305.
89 See the texts of the first recital of the preamble of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures, the sixth recital of the preamble of the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, the preamble of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, the fourth
recital of the preamble of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the preamble and Art.
8.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. For China’s
arguments, see Appellate Body Report, paras. 37 et seq.
90 The first recital of the preamble of the Agreement establishing the WTO recognizes that trade
relations between Members ‘should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the
optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development’ (emphasis added).
91 Appellate Body Report, para. 306.
92 Ibid. (original emphasis).
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it is regretful that the Appellate Body adopted a ‘rigid’ approach, losing the
occasion to fully explore whether any different solutions, in terms of the
applicability of Article XX GATT, could derive from the particular type of
exceptions invoked in the light of the underlying purpose of theWTOAgreement
as a whole.The AB avoided the issue by stating that the language of the preamble
could not be interpreted to provide for a legal basis to apply (generally) Article XX
to non-GATT obligations. However, it failed to consider that the preamble of the
WTO Agreement is not a provision of a material agreement to be interpreted
literally as including or not including language apt to allow recourse to Article XX
to justify the violation of the specific obligation contained therein, but rather
defines the general principles upon which the WTO was edified. Hence, the
Appellate Body reached a conclusion that fails to attach sufficient significance to
the fact that the specific exceptions invoked refer to values theWTO Members have
agreed to reaffirm in the first recital of the preamble of the WTO Agreement as
inspiring the ‘mission’ of the Organization itself as well as the global architecture of
the covered agreements.93
On the basis of the approach embraced by the Appellate Body, a WTO
Member would be prevented to adopt an internal measure aimed at addressing
fundamental interests such as conservation or public health when this measure
would result in a violation of a non-GATT obligation not including an express
reference to GATT Article XX. Such situation would produce a vulnus in the
protection of the values upon which the multilateral trading system was founded,
which hardly could be considered ‘remedied’ by looking at the overall balance of
economic concessions that the Member would benefit from as a result of its
participation to the system, as the Appellate Body seemed to suggest. Such values,
in fact, indisputably lay at the very foundation of the WTO system, and the
participation to the multilateral trading system should never imply that a Member
has to give up a policy which is primarily and genuinely aimed at addressing the
non-trade concerns protected under GATT Article XX b) and g). In this
perspective, the Appellate Body could have engaged in a more ‘courageous’
interpretation so as to identify a limit to the general approach adopted in China –
Raw Materials when the fundamental interests provided for in Article XX b) and g)
93 The policy objectives protected through Arts. b) and g) of Article XX GATT are in fact not only
generally recalled by means of the first recital of the preamble of the WTO Agreement (see supra
n. 90), but also enshrined in the principle of sustainable development explicitly reaffirmed therein and
recognized as one of the cornerstone of the WTO system. For an overview of the progressive
openings of the multilateral trading system to ‘environmental’ concerns through the reference to the
principle of sustainable development as stated in the preamble of theWTO Agreement in the relevant
WTO case law, see Giorgio Sacerdoti, La disciplina del commercio internazionale e la protezione
dell’ambiente, in Il principio dello sviluppo sostenibile nel diritto internazionale ed europeo dell’ambiente 63 et
seq (FOIS P. ed., Editoriale Scientifica 2007).
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are at stake, in the sense to allow for the availability of Article XX b) and/or g)
defences for violations of non-GATT obligations even when language to that
effect has not been incorporated therein.This solution would not run counter to
the view adopted by dispute settlement bodies with regard to the right of every
WTO Member to regulate trade, in that both original members and new
members assuming additional obligations by terms of their accession protocols
voluntary agreed to become members ofWTO, thereby committing to respect the
general principles inspiring the mission of the Organization. Moreover, this
solution would not have an ad hoc basis in that, apart from the (rather limited)
implications with regards to WTO-plus obligations on the specific matter of the
use of export duties– which, as already mentioned, represents a major problem for
China only94 –, it would have a general application with regards to the
applicability of Article XX b) and g) to non-GATT obligations. Hence, it would
integrate with the general approach adopted in China – Raw Materials while
providing for an exception to such approach that will ensure the mutual
supportiveness between trade and environment measures.
5 CONCLUSION
China – Raw Materials represents a landmark case for the definition of the reach of
theWTO discipline on export restraints on the basis of existing GATT provisions
and relevant case law, and will most certainly constitute an obliged point of
94 It should be noted that, according to China, the applicability of Art. XX for violations of para.
11.3 of the Accession Protocol implies that the ‘exceptional circumstances’ referred to in the Note
to Annex 6 could have been invoked both to exceed the maximum rates specified in Annex 6 for
the 84 products listed in the Annex, and to impose duties on non-listed products. Appellate Body
Report, para. 282. This argument differs from the one proposed in this paper in that China tried
to defend the applicability of Art. XX (in general) for violations of para. 11.3 (only) on the basis
of the language of the Note to Annex 6, which however explicitly refers to the possibility to
increase the applied rates on the exportation of the listed products up to the maximum bound
rate indicated in Annex 6. According to the approach suggested here, China could in principle
invoke the defences of Art. XX b) and/or g) only. This is not to say that such measures would be
legitimate under Art. XX b) and/or g). Indeed, the Panel in China – Raw Materials examined the
Chinese export duties on an arguendo basis and concluded that, even if Art. XX were available, they
could not be justified under Art. XX b) and g). More generally, the Panel seemed to consider very
unlikely that measures such as export duties and export restrictions in general could be found to fall
within the scope of the general environmental exceptions: on the one hand, the Panel almost excluded
that such measures could be genuinely considered to relate to conservation within the meaning of Art.
XX (g) by stating that their very nature is ‘very difficult to reconcile with the goal of conserv[ation]’
(see Panel Report, para. 7.434); on the other, it considered such measures as an inappropriate tool to
address environmental externalities in a more effective way compared to other less trade-restrictive
available alternatives (see Panel Report, para. 7.590).
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reference for the purpose of assessing the consistency of similar measures95 at least
until a reform of multilateral rules in this respect will be finalized.96
The purpose of this article has been to analyse in particular the approach
developed by the Appellate Body with regards to the applicability of GATT
Article XX. China – Raw Materials marks in fact a significant step forward with
respect to the previous case China – Audiovisuals in that the decision on the
non-availability of Article XX exceptions for violations of China’s specific
commitments on export duties was not merely rooted on the specific wording of
paragraph 11.3 of the Accession Protocol, but framed within a more general,
‘systemic’ approach to the applicability of Article XX GATT. According to this
approach, Article XX defences are per se available only for violations of GATT
1994 provisions, whereas the legal basis to resort to such defences for violations of
non-GATT obligations is the text of incorporation by cross-reference.
The conclusion reached in China – Raw Materials has highly significant
implications for China, whose margin of manoeuvre to apply export duties results
severely affected by the language of paragraph 11.3 and the lack therein of any
reference to the flexibilities of GATT Article XX. In particular, in the light of the
approach adopted by the dispute settlement bodies, China seems pre-empted from
resorting to Article XX for violations of paragraph 11.3, rendering the outcome of
the new dispute on rare earths in this respect rather predictable.97
The importance of the approach defined in China – Raw Materials, however,
goes beyond the immediate implications for China and for otherWTO Members
assuming stringent additional obligations on the use of export duties – which, as
seen, are rather limited – but concerns all WTO-plus obligations agreed upon by
new members in their accession protocols as well as, more generally, other WTO
95 In particular, such framework is to prove crucial with regards to the new dispute on rare earths
involving China (see supra at sec. 3.3).
96 The strengthening of the discipline on export restrictions has been subject to debate within the
Doha Development Agenda and various proposals have been put in the table both during the
Agriculture negotiations and the NAMA negotiations. See Baris Karapinar, supra n. 12.
97 It has to be noted that chances that the dispute settlement bodies would reverse this conclusion
are quite modest. As a matter of fact, although the Appellate Body has indicated that panel reports
do not constitute subsequent practice for the purposes of Art. 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention,
the WTO panels are often referred to in successive cases as if they were case law. As the Appellate
Body stated in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages: ‘Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT
acquis … .They create legitimate expectations amongWTO members and, therefore, should be taken
into account where they are relevant to any dispute’. See Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
AB-1996-2, Report of Oct. 4, 1996,WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R,WT/DS11/AB/R, at 14.
Indeed, the complainants’ representatives in the new rare earths dispute made clear that the United
States, the European Union and Japan expect China’s export regime on rare earth elements to be
found inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations in line with the previous ruling in China – Raw
Materials. See, for instance, the Statement released by the EUTrade Commissioner Karel De Gucht at
the time of the submission of the request for consultation, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
eutn/psendmessage.htm?tranid=6924.
JOURNAL OFWORLDTRADE1422
provisions falling outside the scope of GATT 1994.This approach, in fact, has the
merit to clarify the relationship between GATT 1994 and WTO obligations
arising from different instruments of theWTO Agreement, such as new members’
accession protocols, in the sense of excluding that Article XX GATT may be
considered as an ‘umbrella clause’ of the WTO Agreement available for violations
of anyWTO provision.
The general applicability of the approach adopted in China – Raw Materials is
appreciable for it defines a uniform solution to guide the interpretation of
WTO-plus obligations while, at the same time, responding to the need to address
the increasing stances for an overall coherence of the system.The Panel’s reasoning
on the limited effects ascribable to the inherent and sovereign right to regulate
trade seems also to reinforce the legitimacy of the approach in this respect.
Nevertheless, confronted with China’s argument according to which ‘the Panel
distorted the balance of rights and obligations established in China’s Accession
Protocol by assuming that China had “abandoned” its right to impose export
duties “to promote fundamental non-trade-related interests, such as conservation
and public health”’,98 the Appellate Body would have strengthened, and not
undermine, the overall integrity and coherence of the system had it ruled for the
admissibility of an exception to the general approach to Article XX GATT in
cases where the fundamental interests protected under Article XX b) and g) are at
stake. In deciding to preserve the general applicability of the approach over the
access to the environmental defences provided for in Article XX b) and g) GATT,
the Appellate Body designed a ‘rigid’ approach and missed the opportunity to
further enhance the protection ensured within the WTO system to the
fundamental values of conservation and public health in the light of the central
importance attached to those values not only within the GATT 1994 but in the
definition of the mission of the Organization itself as stated in the first recital of
the preamble of theWTOAgreement.
98 Appellate Body Report, para. 305.
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